Somali Reconciliation:  Editorial Note by Samatar, Ahmed I. & Samatar, Abdi Ismael
Somali Reconciliation: Editorial Note
Ahmed I. Samatar and Abdi Ismail Samatar
I. Introduction
More than a decade after Mogadishu’s implosion and the subsequent
death of the national state, the Somali saga continues. All told, warlord
politics have turned many parts of the country, particularly the south-
ern regions, into a living hell. Consequently, life expectancy has
declined as dramatically as in some of the AIDS-devastated countries
on the continent, and literacy rates and educational enrollments have
plummeted to the lowest in the world. While this general profile is
rightly worrisome, we still need to disaggregate the reality. For the
purpose of these notes, we offer three guises of the current Somali con-
dition. We start with the most hopeful.
A. Northwest (Somaliland)
In this zone, an indigenously worked out peace prevails and a mod-
icum of order has been restored. Moreover, incipient political struc-
tures are in place, constitutional politics is practiced (typified by recent
and competitive party-based presidential elections), a small but grow-
ing proportion of children are in school, and the rhythm of daily mate-
rial existence and minimum economic transactions are visible. Despite
these commendable achievements, there are a number of acute chal-
lenges that vitiate the prospect: 1) an exodus of talent; 2) severe impov-
erishment; 3) return of the corrupt habits of the old and dead order, as
well as the dominance of the capital, Hargeisa, and its commensurate
sociopolitical class in all of the major decisions and privileges; 4) apos-
tasy with regard to the sanctity of national unity; 5) political appoint-
ments that ignore the public need for a streamlined order, as the
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recently formed over 40-member cabinet demonstrates; 6) failure, after
a decade of claims, to convince any other state or international organi-
zation to recognize the declaration of secession and new sovereignty;
and 7) subservience to Ethiopia that contradicts the ambition of self-
direction and independence.
B. Northeast (Puntland)
In the initial self-definition, the people of this region reaffirmed their
commitment to national unity, and continue to do so. In addition,
before 1998, one could observe a degree of civic-mindedness that man-
ifested itself in consultative politics, an orderly reinvigoration of trade,
and a step towards a rehabilitation of basic social institutions. Disap-
pointingly, what promise these initial developments had is now ener-
vated by the onset of a ruthless, personalistic, and militaristic appetite
for exclusive power. This Siyaad Barre syndrome thrives on a strategy
of low intensity but premeditated coercion, sub-clanistic maneuvers,
and disregard for the immediate development needs of the people of
the zone. More distressing is the making of a client-patron relationship
with Ethiopia — a source of military hardware, cash, and political
patronage.
C. The Rest
These regions, a large swath and some of the most precious parts of
Somalia, are in the grip of violent and chaotic contestation. Primarily
driven by brigandish pursuit of spoils (particularly land and trade)
and political power, the cost has been devastating to both local com-
munities and to any hope of reviving national identity and institutions.
The territories between Mogadishu, Baidoa, and Kismayo are most
affected. Here, too, there seems to be a nasty convergence of self-
aggrandizement through plunderous tactics and strategic manipula-
tion by Ethiopia.
All in all, variable political geography notwithstanding, the dys-
functionality of the old regime, horrendous though it was, seems to
pale in comparison with the debauchery of warlordism and the agony
of the present.
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II. Reconciliation Conferences
A. Arta: Betrayal of a Gift
Since 1991, thirteen reconciliation conferences to restore peace and
national authority have been held. Warlords and factional leaders
dominated eleven of these gatherings, all of which failed to produce
consensus. Each self-appointed warlord was adamant on claiming the
presidency of the country. As a result, most Somalis submitted to the
prospect of not seeing a national state in their lifetime. The bleakness
of the predicament proved so paralyzing that it would fall to the small,
partially Somali-populated Republic of Djibouti and its leader to
recharge hopes of saving Somalia from itself. Ismail Omar Geeleh,
with the zest that accompanies a new presidency, coupled with his
own primordial affinity with the Somali people, made a personal
assignment of the pressing necessities of reducing regional instability
and Djibouti’s immediate vulnerabilities.
With his surprise announcement at the UN General Assembly in
1999 to convene a different gathering to rebuild Somalia, President
Geeleh put the full energy of his administration behind the endeavor.
So it was that this meeting of Somalis took place in Djibouti in March
2000. A series of workshops were conducted for a month. Traditional
leaders, businessmen, women, intellectuals, and others were invited.
Most significantly, warlords were also extended a welcome, but not as
veto holders. All in all, nearly 5,000 delegates came from every region
to deliberate the future of their country. Predictably, most of the more
self-important warlords stayed away; they complained that they were
devalued for not being treated as the preeminent leaders of their
respective communities. In response, the Djibouti hosts reinstated their
welcome as individual participants, equal to the rest, and, therefore,
with no a priori privileged role. While the Government of Djibouti pro-
vided modest facilities and acted as a fair broker, the key actors were
Somali “traditional” leaders and former politicians. One moment in
the proceedings is etched in the memory of those who were present:
negotiations came to a halt when sharp conflicting interests clashed.
Fearful that the whole conference was in danger of collapse, Geeleh
intervened by appealing to the delegates to consider their collective
interest. In an emotionally charged tone, he pleaded, “Somaliyee ii
hiiliya aan idiin hiiliye” (O Somalis, help me so that I can help you). The
appeal moved the delegates and broke the logjam. Afterwards, the key
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obstacle proved to be the selection of the official delegates to the con-
ference who ultimately were to choose a new parliament of 245
deputies. The formula for working out the distribution of the seats was
set at dividing the nation into 4.5 communities. In the meantime, a
national transitional charter was drafted which the delegates approved
and the provisional parliament later adopted. Perhaps the most daunt-
ing task was how to equitably parcel out the parliamentary seats within
each community. This milestone was reached after some acute wran-
gling and, subsequently, Somalia’s first “democratically” selected
chamber of deputies was put into place. Moreover, the chamber pro-
ceeded to elect an interim president from several competing candi-
dates. These developments took place without notable interference
from the Djibouti Government; and, critical to note, none of the
defeated candidates expressed any doubt that the host government
was anything but impartial. In short, the Arta reconciliation conference
brought achievements that seemed farfetched only a few months ear-
lier. The Somali public, on the whole, responded with a conspicuous
sense of relief, elation, and anticipation. In short, though not immune
to intrigues among the delegates and their hangers-on, Arta seemed, in
the words of the ancient poet Horace, “not to draw smoke from the
brightness of light,” as others before it had done, “but to bring out light
from smokey murk.” What would result from this initial success
depended on the caliber of the new leadership, its reception in
Mogadishu and the rest of the country, and the attitude of the neigh-
boring countries, particularly Ethiopia.
Interim President Abdiqasim Salad and his entourage made an
unplanned visit to the ruined capital. Despite the chaos, hundreds of
thousands came out to celebrate what they hoped to be the beginning
of a peaceful era. But the promise soon tumbled as the Transitional
National Government (TNG) was hobbled by a combination of
Ethiopian-cum-warlord subversion and the inherent defects of the
new team.
The first signal of trouble was the transparently unhappy presence
of the Ethiopian Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi, among the dignitaries
during the inaugural ceremony to congratulate Abdiqasim Salad. In
retrospect, Zenawi’s attendance belied his hidden agenda of what he
desired to become of Somalia. Salad immediately dispatched an envoy
to visit Addis Ababa to relay that the new Somali Government was
intent on collaborating closely with its neighbors and strengthening
positive relations between Somalia and Ethiopia. Later, several other
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expeditions were sent to emphasize Somali perspectives, but every
delegation met with Ethiopian skepticism. Within six months, the
Ethiopian strategy became clear. It at once started to stress the incom-
pleteness of the peace process since the warlords were absent, and also
declared that Islamists of the Al-Itihad orientation dominated the
interim government. In response, Salad and his cohorts made several
attempts to demonstrate otherwise and to reassure the Ethiopian lead-
ership. However, the situation deteriorated to a point of no return once
Ethiopia accused Salad himself of being a member of Al-Itihad. From
then on, Addis Ababa adopted a four-pronged strategy to destabilize
and delegitimize the TNG. First, Ethiopia convened a meeting for the
warlords and, in the process, helped establish an umbrella structure
for them to be named the Somali Reconciliation and Reconstruction
Council (SRRC). Second, Ethiopia intensified military supplies for
members of the group. Third, Ethiopia actively lobbied at the Organi-
zation of African Unity (OAU, now AU, the African Union) and other
international organizations to unseat the TNG. In this context, Ethiopia
gave more encouragement to the self-proclaimed “Somaliland Repub-
lic” to enhance the latter’s search for recognition as an independent
country1 while simultaneously repeating platitudes about the unity
and territorial integrity of the Somali Republic at public forums, such
as the assembly of the Heads of State and Governments of the Inter-
Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD) in Eldoret and,
more recently, at the AU meeting in Maputo. Finally, Ethiopia intensi-
fied its campaign at the IGAD forum to convene an IGAD-sponsored
conference to “complete” the Arta process.
In the meantime, the weaknesses of the TNG leadership were
exposed. First to come to the fore was the fact that both the interim
President (Mr. Abdiqasim Salad) and the Prime Minister (Dr. Ali Kalif
Galyedh), as well as many of the cabinet appointees, were remnants of
the Siyaad era. Having failed to publicly atone for that association
undermined any popular hope for the beginning of a new political his-
tory. Second, no broad vision, let alone a specific one, was articulated
for a national mobilization fit for the challenge of the interregnum.
Third, hardly any attention was paid to competence or integrity in the
appointment of a new team, reviving memories of the vulgar and
cheap horse-trading that crippled the old Somali national state. Fourth,
no immediate tactics, never mind a strategy, were conceived to reach
and win over the large and relatively talented Diaspora communities.
Fifth, no quick advantage was taken of the international community,
Ahmed I. Samatar and Abdi Ismail Samatar
5
which was admittedly tired of Somali insouciance toward their
national well-being but which may have become genuinely responsive
to a mature, collective, and intelligent plea from a new and legitimate
Somali leadership. Sixth, Salad and Galyedh clashed and then turned
on each other. Salad accused Galyedh of arrogance, a deficit of dexter-
ity, and, most damaging, malfeasance, while the latter labeled the first
as power hungry and dictatorial. With barely half of the three-year
term of TNG gone, and after a parliamentary vote of no confidence,
Galyedh was dismissed while abroad. As of this writing, the TNG has
all but withered, and with it has vaporized the precious gift from the
Djibouti people and Government, and the exceptional but fleeting
promise of Arta.
B. Eldoret: Corruption and the Ethiopia-Warlord Axis
Ethiopia’s lobby at OAU/AU failed, but its efforts at IGAD paid off.
Members of the organization agreed to launch a Somali conference
managed by what came to be dubbed “frontline states,” comprised of
Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Kenya (the last country acting as Chair). Under
enormous international pressure, the TNG and the Djibouti Govern-
ment agreed to this proposal. Moreover, the TNG assumed the neutral-
ity of Kenya. Sadly, this naïve presumption enabled Ethiopia and
representatives of the international community to change the nature of
the conference from one of reconciling the TNG and the warlords to a
completely new one. The generation of lists representing three groups
— the TNG, the warlords, and the civil society — and the appointment
of a Kenyan, E. Mwangle, well known for his proclivities toward
venality, set the stage for a disheveled and Ethiopia-dominated
process. The earliest alert that this was not a neutral approach tran-
spired when the names of individuals in the civil society group whom
Ethiopia deemed unfriendly were expunged from the list of partici-
pants. Furthermore, when members of the international community
suggested that the conference needed Somali resource persons, Chair-
man Mwangle (Kenya’s special envoy) submitted the list to warlords
for their approval. They rejected it, and, consequently, this act gave
them the confidence to thwart conference deliberations that were not
to their liking. The international representatives reintroduced the list
to the IGAD Technical Committee. Once the Ethiopian delegation real-
ized that the list could not be vetoed, they argued for an expansion by
adding five names they felt were amenable to their agenda. As a result,
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the list of resource persons grew to nearly twenty. This proved to be
quantitatively too cumbersome. Therefore, it was agreed that both
Ethiopia’s and Djibouti’s additions would be put aside. In spite of this
consensus, however, Chairman Mwangle made no attempt to call in
the resource persons to the conference. Moreover, he never convened a
meeting for those among the group who were already in Eldoret.
As the conference commenced, non-Somalis started to make the
agenda. In one instance, when one of the authors of this article was
present, an American doctoral student presented the points, which
comprised the key items in the rules of procedure and the declaration
of the cessation of hostilities. Among them was the establishment of a
federal system of governance, a crucial issue in which Somalis did not
have any say. In addition, the “mediators,” including the graduate stu-
dent who held the title of “advisor” to the Chair, created warlord-dom-
inated “leaders’ committees” as the paramount decision-making
organs of the conference. Again, there was no input from either the
Somalis (outside of the warlords) or those who study Somali society.
The upshot of all these compounded occurrences was that Ethiopia
and its allies continued to try to gerrymander both the composition
and quantity of the delegates. The final list of the participants in the
plenary sessions was finalized as a newly elected government of
Kenya appointed a new envoy (and Chair) to the conference. Further-
more, in January, the site was moved to Mbagathi, on the outskirts of
Nairobi. At that stage, representatives of the international community
and other observers confirmed that Ethiopia single-handedly con-
trolled two-thirds of the list of conference participants.
C. Mbagathi: Incubation of Inept or Illegitimate Order
Previously serving in senior diplomatic posts as well as top civil ser-
vant positions in Kenya’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador B.
Kiplagat came with a clean reputation; that is, a degree of professional-
ism in a postcolonial Kenya known for the opposite. This appointment
injected a sense of hope into the proceedings and Somalis expected
him to behave as an honest mediator, one who would correct past mis-
deeds. Ambassador Kiplagat moved quickly to restore propriety to the
process by relocating the conference to a cheaper location housed in a
college rather than in an expensive hotel in Eldoret.
The first real test came with a contest over the nature of the list of
participants, and the differentiation between the pirates and the legiti-
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mate individuals who represented civic communities. Unfortunately,
Ambassador Kiplagat failed to take action, for he seemed barely
knowledgeable of the Somali problem, his superb diplomatic skills
notwithstanding. Such a shortcoming emboldened those whose project
was to have their own instrumentally advantageous way. Most signifi-
cantly, the warlords and their Ethiopian backers felt ensconced in their
dominant role. But the issue of legitimacy could not be easily avoided,
and Ambassador Kiplagat had to find a way to come to terms with it.
Subsequently, he took the initiative of bringing forth a list of “tradi-
tional leaders” whom he intended to invite to the conference. This the
warlords rejected, demonstrating three pivotal factors: 1) the Ambas-
sador’s lack of knowledge about Somali culture and his unwillingness
to seek counsel from informed Somalis (traditional leaders are not sub-
jects of anyone in communal affairs, let alone warlords); 2) the degree
of power ceded to the warlords since the inception of the conference;
and 3) the significance of Ethiopian partisanship in distorting the nego-
tiations. The puzzling question, then, was this: Why would a civic-
minded and religious man acquiesce to the chicanery of people loyal
only to their caprices (with criminal records to boot) and their patrons,
allowing them to gain so much potency under his gaze? A plausible
explanation was revealed when, on one occasion, the Ambassador con-
fided in another diplomat that he “did not want to fight Ethiopia.”
This sentiment was reinforced by another statement he shared with
one of this article’s authors to the effect that the interests of Ethiopia
and Kenya should be looked after during the conference.
Ethiopia and warlord dominance took a slight dip when Ambas-
sador Kiplagat appointed an independent Somali group to harmonize
the documents produced by the conference’s six functional commit-
tees. A necessity to symmetrize arose due to the paucity of profession-
als among the committee members who could compose an accurate
and readable record of each committee’s proceedings. The Ethiopian
envoy and his deputy were alarmed when the Chairperson (Professor
Abdi Ismail Samatar) of the Harmonization Committee was intro-
duced. The Ethiopian Ambassador claimed that Professor Samatar was
“partisan,” and, therefore, ought to be excluded. This line of argument
did not convince the rest of IGAD’s Technical Committee, which com-
pelled Ethiopia to change its tactics. Ethiopia proposed that if Samatar
was approved as Chair, Ethiopia should be given the opportunity to
name Samatar’s deputy. This demand was turned down. It is impor-
tant to note here that neither Kenya nor Djibouti demanded the same
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privilege. From there on, Ethiopia and its clients focused their energy
on how to derail the Harmonization Committee’s work. Moreover,
once the names of the Harmonization Committee became public, they
disclosed that they would not accept the Committee’s report. Ambas-
sador Kiplagat found himself in a tight spot. He tried to mend fences
with Ethiopia and the warlords by suggesting that the Chairs and
Vice-Chairs of the six committees join the Harmonization team. But
soon the Ambassador realized that the quality of the work would suf-
fer, as these additions were bound to bring their disagreements into
the task of harmonizing the documents.
The Harmonization Committee handed its report to the chairman of
the IGAD Technical Committee, and, after two minor changes, he
requested that the document be presented to a full gathering of the
entire Technical Committee and official representatives from the inter-
national community. Immediately, the Ethiopian emissaries walked
out of the meeting, before reading the report or hearing its verbal pre-
sentation. Nonetheless, the discussion proceeded and the remaining
members of the Technical Committee and international partners com-
mended the overall professional quality of the Harmonization Report
and, more particularly, the draft charter that could cater to the com-
mon interest of the Somali people. Despite the news that, when it
became public, Somalis inside and outside the country were enthusias-
tically receptive to the Harmonization Committee’s document,
Ethiopian representatives began to discredit the draft charter and
egged on their clients to resist it. The Ethiopian ambassador accused
Abdi Samatar of being a “traitor” and anti-Ethiopian. But he failed to
articulate both the reasons behind the charges and the connection
between the Harmonization Report and Ethiopia. After all, the peace
process was for Somalia and not concerned, at least at this stage, with
Somali-Ethiopian relations!
Later, the warlords attempted to produce their own version of the
charter, but brought out a one-page document that addressed only
three articles (the Harmonization Committee’s draft charter had 120
articles). When this proposal did not convince anyone, they put for-
ward a version of the draft charter favorable to their interests. Eighteen
warlords signed a cover letter to Ambassador Kiplagat in which they
openly stated that their version alone should be presented to the ple-
nary of the conference. If not, they threatened, they would walk out of
the peace process altogether. There were six issues that distinguished
the perspective of the warlords and the draft charter forwarded by the
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Harmonization Committee. First, the harmonization document had
120 articles while the warlords’ contained 60 articles. Second, the war-
lords stipulated that the proposed interim parliament should have a
total of 450 members; the Harmonization Committee suggested 171.
Third, the warlords asked for an open-ended size of the executive port-
folios of the new government; the other specified that cabinet appoint-
ments should not exceed thirteen. Fourth, the warlords demanded that
a federal form of governance be adopted immediately; the other pre-
ferred that a national constitutional commission be given the responsi-
bility of developing a federal constitution and determining what the
constituent units should be. Fifth, and most critically, the warlords
proposed that they themselves select members of the new parliament.
The implications of such an idea meant that unelected delegates in the
conference’s plenary would automatically become deputies and, more-
over, the warlords would nominate the remaining fifty-nine MPs. In
contrast, the harmonized charter suggested that communities ought to
select their representatives in the interim parliament. Sixth, the war-
lords asserted that the tenure of an interim government be a period of
five years; the harmonized document designated three years. The two
documents were electronically posted (Hirraan.com) for three weeks,
and readers were able to vote online to register their preference. Eighty
percent of the respondents favored the harmonization charter.
Whatever the relative merits of the two documents, it was flabber-
gasting to witness the audacity of Ethiopia and its clients to demand
that their self-serving draft charter alone should be debated in the ple-
nary session. Also enigmatic was the fact that Ambassador Kiplagat, as
Chairman of IGAD’s Technical Committee, succumbed to their
demands despite the fact that a significant number of the civil society
group and the official delegation of the TNG did not share the war-
lords’ demands. Soon thereafter, the Chairman’s task was made easier
by a growing split within the ranks of the TNG. The Prime Minister
(Mr. Hassan Abshir) and the Speaker of the TNG Parliament (Mr.
Abdulla Deroow) decided, without prior consultation with the TNG’s
decision-making committee, to vote in favor of a warlord’s proposal
for a compromise on major issues. With full realization that this
change of mind contradicted the TNG’s official (written and on file)
position, the Chairman took advantage of the split by rushing the
“signed compromise” to the plenary. Even more bewildering, the ple-
nary’s function as the supreme locus of final debate and decisions
(through consensus), duly stipulated by the conference’s rules of pro-
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cedure, was premeditatedly preempted. Ambassador Kiplagat side-
stepped this protocol and relayed to the plenary that the “leaders” had
agreed on four key issues: the size of the assembly at 351 members;
immediate adoption of federalism; an interim period of four years; and
warlords and faction leaders, in consultation with traditional leaders,
selecting members of parliament. Many of the delegates supporting
the warlord and Ethiopian agenda, having received early notification
of what was to come, cheered as Ambassador Kiplagat made the
announcement. Others who did not have forewarning objected to what
they saw as a deceitful stampede. Subsequently, they requested that
the issues be discussed. Ambassador Kiplagat responded that the deci-
sion was final and immediately adjourned the meeting. The Ambas-
sador’s behavior contravened the letter and spirit of reconciliation, and
fueled a growing suspicion that he was predisposed from the outset
toward a warlord-Ethiopian pact. At such a late hour, unless he
regained his role as an impartial mediator, the entire process was
likely to become illegitimate, with Kenya’s accepted role as a neutral
Somali neighbor fatally damaged and the peace conference doomed to
the same fate as the many others that preceded it. For Ethiopia and its
client warlords, their long-term project was clear: the warlords desired
to either take total control of the country without the bother of the
niceties of representation and democratic legitimacy or to remain in
command of separate fiefdoms. For its part, Ethiopia seemed bent on
helping establish either a weak client state in Somalia led by a favorite
warlord or, perhaps better, fragmented and Bantustan-like territories
in which Addis Ababa would call the shots more directly. In brief, the
last scenario Ethiopia would welcome was a united and reinvigorated
country, led by independent-minded and able Somali leaders.2
What, then, are the prospects for reconciliation and national
redemption? The Eldoret-Mbagathi process will presumably produce
a national dispensation but the germane question is whether that will
serve the Somali people. The first thing a keen observer of the IGAD
conference detects is that the process made minimal progress in recon-
ciling Somalis.3 On the contrary, the entire operation had focused on
power sharing and the number of delegates representing different fac-
tions and groups rather than the issues that brought Somalia to its dis-
mal predicament. Neither the current envoy nor his predecessor had
invested any meaningful effort in reconciliation. As a matter of fact,
Ambassador Kiplagat’s action on July 5th violated the conference’s
rules of procedure and exacerbated the rift within the TNG. Second,
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the dominance of warlords and faction leaders (some illiterate and oth-
ers known for exceptional incompetence) in the conference bodes ill
for Somalia’s post-conflict dispensation. For instance, one of the two
power-sharing formulas calls for the warlords and faction leaders, in
consultation with traditional leaders, to appoint parliamentarians. If
this method prevails, it is certain that the merchants of violence and
their supporters will constitute the majority of deputies in parliament
as well as take up key positions in the new provisional administration.
Alternatively, traditional leaders, in consultation with faction and
political leaders, will select members of parliament. Such an assembly
could have a broader representative base. However, it is implausible
that the ability of the MPs will be significantly greater than those
appointed through the other approach. In addition, the major rivals in
Mbagathi are of the same mind that parliament should be composed of
315 deputies at the least, and that cabinet portfolios should be unneces-
sarily numerous, as in the case of the TNG or Northwest (Somaliland)
administration. The cost of such an operation will not only be prohibi-
tive, but underscores the total preoccupation with the politics of indi-
vidual greed and civic disarray. In the end, whether warlords or
traditional leaders appoint members of parliament, the fact remains
that the likely confluence of an imprudently expansive assembly and
government, and the propensity for low quality political leadership, is
bound to cripple the promise.
III. Final Thoughts
As this issue of Bildhaan goes to press, we return to the large and essen-
tial question of the times: transition. By definition, transition is a histor-
ical period (longer than an interim or emergency) of both great danger
and promise. The danger entails, minimally, the constant invasion of
misery and cruelty. At its worst, transition normalizes bestial politics.
The upside of this uncertain but potentially recuperative time is the
possibility, if imaginatively and promptly acted upon, to turn contem-
porary history in a propulsive and positive direction. If the latter is to
be the case for Somalia, we proffer several strategic issues that seem to
be imperative. We comment on each briefly.
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A. International Involvement
From our perspective, the broader international community looks
unwilling to intervene to help modify the outcome of the conference,
while IGAD’s Technical Committee appears content with the proceed-
ings. In the immediate range, then, only stringent external involve-
ment could alter this seemingly foregone fate. For example, the
European Community and the Arab League, who are prepared to sig-
nificantly fund the new dispensation, can insist on the conditionality
that, among others, the legislative and executive branches must not
oversee the reestablishment of the administrative structures of the
country for the first two years of the interim. Here, about 100 former
senior civil servants, with a record of diligence and propriety, and
younger but highly qualified professionals, mostly in the Diaspora,
could be mobilized to undertake the assignment. Furthermore, an
independent and seasoned body (no more than a dozen) of expatriates
and Somalis could supervise the new bureaucracy. The government
would assume its normal dominion once the country is disarmed and
the fundamental structures are in place. The probability is high that the
new arrangement will crash under its own dead weight, unless this
design or another akin to it is put into place.
B. Constitutional Order
This involves the conception of a binding document that enshrines
what most Somalis yearn for: the supremacy of law and fundamental
but examined Somali moral values (including progressive and worldly
Islamic ideas and experiences); guarantees of individual liberty and
freedom of press and association; demarcation of the limits, separa-
tion, and distribution of institutional power; flexibility to accommo-
date amendments that future generations might need to enact; and
legitimation through an endorsement by the majority (perhaps up to
two-thirds) of the adult citizens. The mutual dependence of law and
morals was underscored, long ago, by none other than Nicoló Machi-
avelli: “There is no law or constitution which can restrain . . . universal
corruption, for as good morals need to be maintained by laws, so laws
require good morals to be observed.”
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C. Leadership
This is perhaps the greatest of all the ills that bedevil Somali society. It
is now common knowledge that even the most promising opportuni-
ties for reconciliation and recomposition (e.g., Arta) floundered largely
as a result of hapless leadership—a leadership that failed to realize, at
the very moment of its triumph, that the appointed hour had arrived. In
the next round, then, the criteria for public leadership, particularly at
the highest levels, must at least stress the following: visionary think-
ing, energy, competence, and, above all, a prior record of propriety.
Combined and vigorously applied, such a composite should put to rest
the widespread but repulsive and disastrous notion that anyone loud
enough, clanistic enough, and corrupt enough can thrust himself (and
it has been a he thus far) onto center stage. A transparent process of
public viewing ought to be at the core of distinguishing among any
aspirants. After all, state making and leadership are partly a reflection
of the collective keenness of intelligence and character of a people.
*****
After the hemorrhage it has taken, Somalia cannot reconstruct without
enormous and long-term international attention and material support.
While it is essential that a new dispensation demonstrates a mode of
self-reliance so different from the beggarly attitudes that defined the
dead epoch, Somalia’s chronic poverty, compounded by the political
catastrophe, compels solicitation of concrete financial and technical
contributions from the rest of the world. However, extreme caution
must be exercised here. To redirect some of the world’s attention to
Somalia’s enduring needs will require that the transitional regime does
its own homework. Such a task ought to include identification and
articulation of the critical needs and their cost, as well as the persua-
sion of potential donors of the logic, transparency, and feasibility of
these objectives.
Finally, if the transition’s potential is realized, there is a great likeli-
hood that most Somalis, including those who live within the confines
of a separatist region (i.e., Somaliland), will rally behind a national
reconstitution. The central challenge, then, is to demonstrate to every-
one that something enabling, wise, and prefigurative of an ennobling
future is, at last, taking shape in Somalia.
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Notes
1. Ethiopia is the only country that accepts the Somaliland passport to be used in its ter-
ritory. Ironically, some Somaliland Ministers use old Somali Republic or Djibouti pass-
ports to travel.
2. We are able to assert these conclusions as they run parallel to the ways in which the
Tigray-dominated regime in Addis Ababa tightly manages regional affairs while preten-
tiously proclaiming the regional autonomy of the country’s ethnic provinces. See Abdi
Ismail Samatar, “Ethiopia’s Federated or Forced Ethnics: A Somali Reality Check” (forth-
coming).
3. In spite of the IGAD Technical Committee’s poor performance, the Kenyan Envoy has
convinced the UNDP office for Somalia (Nairobi) that the Technical Committee’s tenure
should be extended for at least six months after a Somali interim government is formed.
The UNDP report estimates that the TC will need at least one million dollars for that dura-
tion. It seems to us that since the TC has been so dysfunctional and partisan in the recon-
ciliation process, it does not deserve such a handsome reward. We are concerned that
lengthening the life of the TC and giving it a platform will be counterproductive. More-
over, the million dollars could easily be put to a better use, as, for instance, supplying
medicine to the children’s hospital in Mogadishu.
Ahmed I. Samatar and Abdi Ismail Samatar
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